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“A HUMAN BEING’S HIGHEST PERFECTION”:  
THE GRAMMAR AND VOCABULARY OF VIRTUE IN 
KIERKEGAARD’S UPBUILDING DISCOURSES
Pieter H. Vos
Focusing on the grammar and vocabulary of virtue in Kierkegaard’s 
upbuilding works, it is argued that the Danish philosopher represents a 
Christian conception of the moral life that is distinct from but—contrary to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim—not completely opposed to Aristotelian and 
Thomistic virtue ethics. Although the realities of sin and salvation transcend 
virtue ethics based purely on human nature, it is demonstrated that this does 
not prevent Kierkegaard from speaking constructively about human nature, 
its teleology (a teleological conception of the self) and about the virtues. Yet, 
from a Christian “upbuilding” perspective, general features of human nature 
must be transformed profoundly, which implies more than a harmonious 
perfection or completion of nature (Aquinas), but less than the complete 
replacement of nature by grace. Since this can be seen as a particular con­
tribution to virtue ethics, in this specific sense, Kierkegaard may be called a 
virtue ethicist.
Several attempts have been made to open up a dialogue between Søren 
Kierkegaard and virtue ethics in general and Alasdair MacIntyre’s con­
temporary account of virtue ethics in particular. Many of those who 
contributed to this dialogue criticized MacIntyre’s portrayal of Kierke­
gaard as an advocate of an irrational “criterionless choice”1 by outlining 
Kierkegaard’s account of the nature of choice and rationality in the ethical 
sphere.2 Others offered explorations of similarities and differences be­
tween both thinkers on various themes, e.g., their valuation of modern 
ethics, their understanding of character formation and selfhood, and the 
status of moral rationality in relation to divine revelation.3
However, MacIntyre himself stays skeptical about the possibility of 
connecting Kierkegaardian existential ethics and Aristotelian-Thomistic 
1MacIntyre, After Virtue, 39.
2Davenport, “The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice” and Rudd, “Reason in Ethics.” 
3Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue”; Marino, “The Place of Reason in Kierke-
gaard’s Ethics”; Lillegard, “Thinking with Kierkegaard and MacIntyre”; Mooney, “The Perils 
of Polarity.”
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virtue ethics.4 In his concluding chapter to the volume Kierkegaard after 
MacIntyre, he points to two important issues. First, although he admits 
that his portrayal of Kierkegaard was mistaken in several respects—he 
“ignored the complexity of the relationships between the choice of the 
ethical, the self that makes that choice, and the self that is constituted by 
that choice”5—MacIntyre seems to insist that according to Kierkegaard 
the only way to make the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical (and 
from the ethical to the religious) is by way of a criterionless choice.6 On 
the other hand, very interestingly, MacIntyre suggests that a different 
interpretation is possible as well, an interpretation in which the ethical 
continuity between the aesthetic (in a negative sense) and the ethical is 
acknowledged.
Hence, it is the second issue that creates the real gap between MacIntyre 
and Kierkegaard, a gap stemming from large differences between any 
Aristotelian­Thomistic position on the one hand and Kierkegaard’s theo­
logical conceptions of revelation and faith as opposed to human reason 
and nature on the other. Contrary to Kierkegaard, MacIntyre insists that, 
“prior to and independently of revelation and of the gift of faith, we do 
have a conception of the human good adequate to provide direction for 
our actions and a knowledge of the corresponding precepts of natural law 
that we can be held accountable by God.”7 Whereas in Aquinas’s view 
grace presupposes and builds upon nature, in Kierkegaard’s view there 
seems no relationship between the moral and intellectual virtues on the 
one hand and theological virtues on the other. Moreover, Kierkegaard 
presupposes a very different set of relationships between the will, reason, 
and the passions from those described by either Aristotle or Aquinas. 
According to MacIntyre, Kierkegaard has no place for rational choice (pro­
hairesis or electio) as condition of how the virtues determine the character 
of our actions. His ethics is focused on “the categorical imperative of the 
will.”8 In conclusion, “the gap between an Aristotelian or Thomist ethics 
of the virtues and a Kierkegaardian ethics is just too great.”9
However, in this essay I will argue that Kierkegaard is to be located 
in a Christian moral tradition—in line with Augustine and the Reforma­
tion—that is distinct from but not completely opposed to Aristotelianism 
and Thomism. As some other Kierkegaard scholars have pointed out, 
Kierkegaard sees an essential divide between antiquity, including classical 
virtue ethics, and Christianity, a tension MacIntyre seems to under­
rate. Kierkegaard’s Christian religiousness depends on a Augustinian 
4MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 339–355.
5MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 340.
6MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 341. 
7MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 351.
8MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 355.
9MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 353.
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recognition of the rift between Greek philosophy and Christianity.10 Al­
though in Kierkegaard’s thought the realities of the Christian drama of 
sin and salvation decisively criticize and transcend an Aristotelian moral 
theory based on “human nature,” this criticism does not prevent him from 
speaking in a positive way about human nature, its teleology, and the 
virtues. Yet, from a Christian perspective such general features of human 
nature must be transformed profoundly, i.e., a qualitative transformation 
of character is needed, as I will demonstrate in an analysis of some of 
Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses. In this respect, Kierkegaard also 
disagrees with a Thomistic model of grace completing or perfecting na­
ture, as adopted by MacIntyre.
Therefore, the question is if and in what respect Kierkegaard can be 
regarded as a “virtue ethicist.”11 The answer to this question depends 
on what we consider a proper definition of “virtue ethics.” As Christine 
Swanton has demonstrated, definitions that identify virtue ethics with 
just one tradition, for instance Aristotelian eudaimonism or Thomism, or 
a single exemplar, for instance Aristotle or Aquinas, do not suffice, since 
they would exclude other traditions and figures that have a claim to be 
understood in virtue­ethical terms.12 Therefore, even if Kierkegaard ap­
pears not to be very Aristotelian or Thomistic, it is still an open question 
whether Kierkegaard can be considered a virtue ethicist, and if so, what 
kind of virtue ethicist he may be, or to put it a little differently: what 
specific contribution he could offer to virtue ethics.
Focusing on the grammar and vocabulary of virtue in Kierkegaard’s up­
building works, I will argue that Kierkegaard can be understood as virtue 
ethicist in the sense that he clearly uses the language of virtue, the virtues 
and character formation, but that he can not be identified as Aristotelian 
or Thomist. Precisely by emphasizing the need of radical transformation 
of human nature before God, Kierkegaard offers a specific contribu­
tion to virtue ethics that reaches beyond Aristotelianism and Thomism. 
First of all, I will shortly address MacIntyre’s criticism of the ethical as 
a “criterionless choice” by arguing that Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
the self is teleological and that the aesthetic and the ethical as well as the 
transition from the former to the latter should be understood within a 
teleologically­structured anthropological framework that underlies all 
of Kierkegaard’s writings. Next, I will investigate how Kierkegaard ex­
plicitly refers to Aristotelian (and Thomistic) virtue­ethical concepts, and 
10Johnson, “Neither Aristotle nor Nietzsche,” points out that Kierkegaard’s Religiousness 
B is beyond MacIntyre’s famous “Aristotle or Nietzsche.” Carr, “After Paganism,” argues that 
Kierkegaard does not present an emotivism avant la lettre, but rather joins a long line of Chris­
tian theology that is suspicious of natural theology because this tradition shows a tendency 
to dilute or remove the absoluteness of revelation. Kierkegaard joins those theologians in the 
Christian tradition that oppose Platonic and Aristotelian rationalism.
11Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and a Method of ‘Virtue Ethics,’” 48: “I am ar­
guing . . . that Kierkegaard is pre-eminently a ‘virtue ethicist.’”
12Swanton, “The Definition of Virtue Ethics,” 316–319. 
314 Faith and Philosophy
argue that Kierkegaard both values important classical virtue­ethical ele­
ments and emphasizes the need for radical transformation. I will proceed 
by explaining the nature of this need in an analysis of how the language 
of perfection and perfectability is completely inverted from independency 
to dependency on God, and from striving for excellence to “becoming 
nothing.” Finally, it will be demonstrated that a grammar of virtue is 
present in the upbuilding discourses, and that therefore, Kierkegaard’s 
transformative account of virtue and the virtues should indeed be con­
ceived as a contribution to virtue ethics. In this specific sense, Kierkegaard 
may be called a virtue ethicist.
“A Human Being’s Highest Perfection”: A Teleological Conception of the Self
Let us start with a brief examination of MacIntyre’s criticism of what he 
calls “criterionless choice.” In his contribution to the volume Kierkegaard 
after MacIntyre, MacIntyre first argues that Either/Or denies the possibility 
of mediation between the aesthetic and the ethical, which implies an ex­
clusion of thought and reason and a fortiori of philosophy. There may be 
good ethical reasons to make the transition, but from the aesthetic point 
of view one has attitudes and beliefs that seem to disable the aesthete 
from evaluating and appreciating those views. One has to have already 
chosen oneself as an ethical subject in order to be able to appreciate those 
reasons. It can only retrospectively be understood as rationally justifiable, 
not prospectively.13
At the same time MacIntyre seems to agree with Peter J. Mehl, John 
J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd14 that Kierkegaard’s anthropology en­
tails a central teleological view of human nature and “that it does indeed 
follow from that view that there are good reasons for individuals to move 
from the aesthetic to the ethical and not merely good­reasons­from the 
standpoint­of­the­ethical.”15 Moreover, Norman Lillegard’s contribution 
to the volume helps MacIntyre to discover a different possible interpreta­
tion of the nature of the aesthetic: suppose that the aesthetic personality 
can be viewed as one that is engaged in unacknowledged resistance to the 
ethical, “so that the aesthetic life requires a silent, but determined refusal 
of the ethical” and as such is already engaged with the ethical.16 Whereas 
the dominant interpretation emphasizes the discontinuity between the 
aesthetic and the ethical, this strand of interpretation points to the conti­
nuities in the subtext.
In my view, MacIntyre’s intuition is right, but he is not able to conceptu­
alize it properly because he limits himself to analyses of what Kierkegaard 
later calls “the aesthetic authorship” and doesn’t take into account that 
13MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 344.
14Mehl, “Kierkegaard and the Relativist Challenge to Practical Philosophy,” Davenport, 
“The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice,” and Rudd, “Reason in Ethics,” respectively.
15MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 344.
16MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” 348.
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an anthropological framework in which human nature is directed to­
wards an ethical­religious telos underlies all Kierkegaard’s works. In fact, 
this framework centers on what MacIntyre calls a conception of human­
nature­as­it­could­be­if­it­realized­its­telos.17 The teleologically­structured 
anthropological view is not just a perspective within the ethical sphere, 
as presented in Either/Or II, but is part of Kierkegaard’s anthropological 
framework that underlies all his elaborations of existential spheres and 
the figures that represent these spheres in the pseudonymous works, and 
culminates in the formula of the self in The Sickness unto Death and the 
way this formula functions in the topology of the various manifestations 
of despair. Thus, the various existential spheres and their individual ex­
pressions in actuality are to be distinguished from this anthropological 
framework as human potentiality. Mehl makes a similar claim by pointing 
to the distinction between “ethical reality” as the general potential of be­
coming and being a person on the one hand, and the “subjectively actual” 
that refers to the actual or existential maintaining of this ethical reality 
by an individual in his concrete existence, on the other.18 The former 
designates a potential that every individual possesses as a human being. 
It may be characterized as a “natural predisposition,” in a sense akin to 
a (neo)Aristotelian conception of human nature. Whereas the ethical in 
the latter sense may be conceived of as a stage or life-sphere, the ethical 
in the former sense is not a stage but qualifies human nature/the self as 
such. MacIntyre’s interpretation ignores that this distinction is explicit in 
Kierkegaard’s works, resulting in contradictory evaluations of the rela­
tionship between the aesthetic and the ethical.
A concept of the human being as a potentiality for development into a 
deeper self runs through Kierkegaard’s oeuvre from Either/Or to The Sick­
ness unto Death,19 and underlies the upbuilding works as well. In Either/Or 
this potentiality is described in terms of choice: the self chooses himself, not 
in his initial state of immediacy but in his “eternal validity.”20 In the 1844 
17MacIntyre, After Virtue, 40–41.
18Mehl, “Kierkegaard and the Relativist Challenge to Practical Philosophy,” 14. I take this 
as a more appropriate distinction than Davenport’s between (1) the cognitive awareness of 
the objective authority of moral principles, a condition shared by both the aesthete and the 
ethicist, and (2) volitional identification which gives one’s actions personal significance, a 
condition only satisfied by the ethicist (Davenport, “The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice,” 
82–83). Either/Or II is not so much about “the objective authority of moral principles” as 
about “ethical subjectivity” as a precondition for ethics. 
19Evans speaks of “a teleological view of human nature” (Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 21) 
that is “fleshed out in a proper Aristotelian way with reference to capacities that are both 
universally human and distinctive in the way that humans exemplify them” (Kierkegaard’s 
Ethic of Love, 19). Whereas other works, like Fear and Trembling, are more akin to a divine 
command ethics, the Aristotelian view is present in the core idea of becoming oneself, for 
instance in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where Johannes Climacus says 
that it is “every individual’s task to become a whole person” (346 / SKS 7, 316). [SKS refers to 
Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter.]
20Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 211 / SKS 3, 203. On the one hand, the idea of the absolute 
makes the self qualitatively different from how he existed before. On the other hand, 
choosing himself in his eternal validity does not mean that the self becomes someone other 
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upbuilding discourse “To Need God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfec­
tion” a similar distinction is made, but in a somewhat different setting. The 
discourse speaks of a “first self” that must develop into a “deeper self.” 
The relation between these two “selves” is portrayed as an inner struggle, 
a dialogue. Kierkegaard emphasizes the dynamics and development of the 
process of becoming oneself. In this upbuilding discourse he even uses 
the language of sickness and becoming healthy that is so characteristic of 
his later work: the deeper self is like a physician at the bedside of the sick, 
knowing that “this sickness is not unto death but unto life.”21 Whereas the 
first self is turned outward in seeking after the surrounding world as object 
of identification, the deeper self is aimed at turning the first self away from 
immediacy and externality to true self-knowledge.22 This does not mean 
that the conditions of the first self are completely worthless. In the end, 
when the first self submits to the deeper self, they are “reconciled.”
Since becoming a free responsible person is a potentiality that belongs to 
each individual’s natural capacity, knowledge of the human telos is a matter 
of each individual’s self-reflexive relationship to him- or herself. Basi­
cally, the human potential of personhood that belongs to each individual’s 
natural capacity is itself the normative standard by which to measure one’s 
own existence. In order to acquire a true conception of oneself, one must 
be like a teacher in relation to oneself as a learner, as one of the discourses 
expresses it.23 In this sense, the ethical choice, as the affirmation of the task 
to actualize oneself as this definite individual, is not criterionless. It is an 
affirmation of oneself as a responsible human agent. The upbuilding dis­
course “To Need God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection” expresses 
the central meaning of self­knowledge by emphasizing that the task is to 
know oneself not in relation to something else, but in relation to oneself.24 
To be sure, the discourse also directs the reader to the self “before God,” 
which makes a significant difference. I will return to this after an examina­
tion of Kierkegaard’s use of virtue­ethical language in general.
The Vocabulary of Character and Virtue
Although Kierkegaard’s anthropological scheme is teleologically struc­
tured, the vocabulary of “self,” “existence,” “choice,” and “subjectivity,” 
to which I referred in the preceding section, is apparently a modern one. 
What about virtue ethical concepts like “character” and “virtue”—how 
are they actually present in Kierkegaard’s works?
than he was before, but that he becomes himself, that is, that he chooses or, more correctly, 
receives himself as someone who existed before as this specific being who he is and no other 
(Either/Or II, 177, 215 / SKS 3, 172–173, 206–207). 
21Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 315 / SKS 5, 307.
22Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 309 / SKS 5, 301.
23Kierkegaard, Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 60 / SKS 5, 434.
24Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 313 / SKS 5, 305.
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Kierkegaard does indeed employ the term “character.” Whereas 
“subjectivity” functions in contrast with the interest of speculative phi­
losophy, and “individual” is defined in contrast with a life oriented to 
and by “the crowd,” and “self” designates the spiritual task of becoming 
oneself as opposed to being in anxiety or despair, and all these concepts 
are mainly directed towards modern phenomena, “character” refers to a 
classical virtue­ethical background. In A Literary Review it is used in con­
trast with the personality formation typical of the present age: “Morality 
is character; character is something engraved (χαρασσω); but the sea has 
no character, nor does the sand, nor abstract common sense, either, for 
character is inwardness.”25 Here, Kierkegaard refers to the etymology of 
the concept, which we also find in classical virtue ethical accounts. With 
Robert C. Roberts, Kierkegaard’s concept of character may be described as 
“sustained dispositional ethical . . . interest” or “commitment.”26
Moreover, character is a matter of formation. In The Book on Adler 
Kierkegaard refers approvingly to the importance of character forma­
tion: “In antiquity the importance of a person’s upbringing was valued 
very highly, and it was understood as a harmonious development of that 
which will carry the various gifts and talents and the disposition of the 
personality ethically in the direction of character.”27 Unfortunately, this 
“ethical education of character,” is replaced in modernity by an emphasis 
on “instruction” and the child is supposed to be able to bring up himself, 
which is “a great mistake.”28
In the upbuilding discourses the term “character” is absent, but as the 
quotation from A Literary Review indicates, “inwardness,” which is fre­
quently used in the discourses, functions more or less as its equivalent. 
Although this term is often contrasted with the outer world, its meaning is 
not limited to “a turn inward” or a “private interiority,” but means some­
thing like “basic concern.” This becomes clear in the upbuilding discourse 
“Strengthening in the Inner Being,” where Kierkegaard writes about a 
person to whom not just a concern for things in the world awakens, but “a 
concern about what meaning the world has for him and he for the world 
. . . only then does the inner being announce its presence in this concern.”29
Furthermore, inwardness as long­term and intensive concern is closely 
related to another concept: passion. In A Literary Review Kierkegaard 
speaks of an “essential passion” (vaesentlige Lidenskab),30 which David J. 
Gouwens describes as “an extensive interest that shapes a person’s life in 
25Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 77–78 / SKS 8, 75.
26Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue,” 180.
27Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, 133 / SKS 15, 286.
28Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, 133 / SKS 15, 286.
29Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 86 / SKS 5, 93. I agree with Gouwens, 
Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 97, that the juxtaposition of “inner being” and “concern” is 
central here. 
30Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 62 / SKS 8, 61. 
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great breadth.”31 Inwardness as intensive concern finds its counterpart in 
passion as extensive interest. This does not mean that every passion or 
emotion is capable of integrating personality into a moral character, only 
“essential passion” is. It is more than just an emotion, it is a uniting “idea” 
to which a person is passionately related, for instance a passion for justice, 
which encompasses a person’s entire life as characterized by “seeking 
justice.”32 In short, both inwardness and essential passion are constitutive of 
Kierkegaard’s concept of “character.” The idea of an essential passion and 
commitment is similar to classical conceptions, probably more to Platonic 
eros than to the (neo)Aristotelian idea of telos. At least, essential passion as 
a “uniting idea” is more “rational” than MacIntyre presupposes in his criti­
cism of Kierkegaard’s supposed voluntaristic view of morality.
The same holds for Kierkegaard’s treatment of continuity or stability 
of character. In A Literary Review Kierkegaard explains that whereas a 
person without character is an “unstable emptiness,” a person with char­
acter has something to “dwell upon.”33 In the discourse “To Need God is 
a Human Being’s Highest Perfection,” constancy is what the “deeper self” 
offers amidst the changing reality and inconstancy of the “first self.”34 In 
a sense, the occasional discourse on “Purity of Heart” is dedicated to an 
exploration of constancy of character: purity of heart is to will one thing. 
Kierkegaard argues that only “the good” is truly one. Only by taking on 
the essential character of the object of his willing (the good) can the self 
be pure in heart, i.e., one. On the other hand, he can be one only when he 
wills the good.35 Interestingly, it is precisely this thought—purity of heart 
is to will one thing—which MacIntyre approvingly quotes and explicitly 
relates to the (neo)Aristotelian­Thomistic concept of “integrity” or “con­
stancy,” i.e., “singleness of purpose in a whole life.”36 In doing so, he in 
fact presupposes the teleological meaning of Kierkegaard’s argument in 
this discourse.
Valuing and Transcending Aristotle’s Realism
All these elements reflect important features of the virtue-ethical tradi­
tion, but for the most part rather implicitly. It is still a question to what 
extent Kierkegaard actually derives his concepts from Aristotle and other 
virtue­ethical representatives. An adequate way to answer this question 
is to trace how Kierkegaard explicitly values key representatives of virtue 
ethics like Aristotle and Aquinas and their virtue ethical concepts. From his 
31Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 97.
32Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, 97. 
33Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 54 / SKS 8, 54. See also Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue,” 
180.
34Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 314 / SKS 5, 306.
35See Connell, To Be One Thing, 160–161. 
36MacIntyre, After Virtue, 203, as well as his Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 165, and 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry, 143.
319VIRTUE IN KIERKEGAARD’S UPBUILDING DISCOURSES
Notebooks we know that Kierkegaard read the Nicomachean Ethics, but he 
did not show any serious interest in Aquinas. Since at the time Hegelians 
were the only people that sympathized with Aquinas, in Kierkegaard’s 
perception, Aquinas was under the verdict of being an “objective thinker.” 
Moreover, as a Lutheran, Kierkegaard was theologically on a different 
track, as we will see.37 Therefore, let’s turn to his reading of Aristotle.
Kierkegaard read the Nicomachean Ethics in 1842. In Notebook 13 
we find a collection of interesting entries on Aristotle’s Ethics,38 which 
Kierkegaard apparently read both in German and Greek, but quickly and 
superficially, as Håvard Løkke argues, for “it did not make a great impres­
sion on Kierkegaard.”39 Løkke analyzes that Kierkegaard’s notes, together 
with other instances in his works where he refers to Aristotle’s ethics, are 
concerned with two themes: first, with how an agent’s ignorance bears on 
the agent’s act being voluntary or not, second, with the human being as 
social, especially in terms of friendship.
If I limit myself to the first theme, Kierkegaard correctly observes that 
Aristotle regards the voluntary as a wider category than προαίρεσις (pro­
hairesis). However, it is striking, as Løkke demonstrates, that Kierkegaard 
translates the latter by “intention” (Forsæt) instead of “choice” or “deci­
sion.” Løkke concludes that Kierkegaard did not discover that choice is a 
key notion in Aristotle’s ethics.40 This may be correct, but does not mean 
that Kierkegaard and Aristotle do not have much in common on this con­
cept (although there are differences in how each thinker relates reason, 
will, and the passions).
Furthermore, in my view, Løkke’s overall evaluation of Kierkegaard’s 
treatment of Aristotle is too limited. For it is noteworthy that Kierkegaard 
is on Aristotle’s side against Socrates and Plato in rejecting the view that 
we are entirely governed by reason. According to Kierkegaard, Aristotle 
dismisses their “idealistic view . . . that all sin is ignorance.” Nevertheless, 
Aristotle too “does not eliminate the difficulty, because he merely ends in 
a realistic counterposition.”41 Løkke interprets this realistic position in the 
sense that, according to Kierkegaard, Aristotle limits himself to concrete 
cases and situations, in particular that whether something happens or not 
depends on one’s choice,42 while, for Løkke, Kierkegaard fails to understand 
37See Olivares Bøgeskov, “Thomas Aquinas: Kierkegaard’s View Based on Scattered and 
Uncertain Sources,” 183–206.
38Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 385–386 / SKS 19, 387–389; Not13:10–21.
39Håvard Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 47–49, quote on 49. 
40Håvard Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 53.
41Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 385–386 / SKS 19, 387–388; Not13:15.
42Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 54, who quotes Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 17 
note / SKS 4, 225, where the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus dwells on Greek 
thought: “‘The depraved person and the virtuous person presumably do not have the power 
over their moral condition, but in the beginning they have the power to become the one or 
the other, just as the person who throws a stone has power over it before he throws it but 
not when he has thrown it’ (Aristotle).” This quote seems to refer to Nicomachean Ethics 1114a 
12–19.
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Aristotle’s point that the choice is not merely directed to concrete actions, 
but to becoming a virtuous person, a good character. I think that this is a 
speculative interpretation of Kierkegaard’s comments. In my interpretation, 
Kierkegaard regards Aristotle’s realistic position as a better alternative to the 
intellectual psychology of Socrates and Plato, because Aristotle stresses the 
voluntary nature of “sin,” “such that something can be voluntary without 
being intended,”43 as Kierkegaard remarks in the entry immediately pre­
ceding the one on Aristotle’s counterposition to Socrates/Plato. At the same 
time, this is still not a solution, because in Aristotle’s account the problem 
of sin is not solved. These remarks clearly reveal Kierkegaard’s own posi­
tion in regard of Aristotelian virtue ethics: Aristotle rightly holds a realistic 
view of human shortcomings and sin in comparison with the ideal of moral 
excellence, but cannot solve the problem of sin. Since human fallibility is a 
core problem, from Kierkegaard’s approach any virtue ethics needs a theo­
logical basis that marks the human being’s dependency on God and His 
forgiveness, as we will see.
Meanwhile, Kierkegaard’s notes reveal that he was aware of some im­
portant classical virtue­ethical presuppositions. First, he acknowledges 
the importance of the Aristotelian μεσότης (mesotès) or mean in the moral 
virtues, such as courage, temperance, generosity and justice, and under­
lines its correctness, for desire and disinclination as the things with which 
the moral virtues struggle are neither good nor evil in themselves. He 
also observes that the mean is not used in Aristotle’s conception of the 
intellectual virtues, and mentions these virtues: τέχνη (technè), ἐπιστήμη 
(epistèmè), σωφροσύνη (soophrosunè), νοῦς (nous), σοφία (sophia), though it 
is a mistake to mention σωφροσύνη here instead of the very important Ar­
istotelian virtue of φρόνησις (phronèsis). Second, Kierkegaard emphasizes 
that virtue is to be seen as an attitude or acquired ability (ἕξις, heksis), which 
brings continuity in one’s acting. Third, notwithstanding Kierkegaard’s 
wrong translation, he observes the centrality of προαίρεσις in Aristotle 
and, contrary to MacIntyre’s claim that I referred to in the introduction, 
the idea that our lives are morally formed by our previous deliberate 
choices is present in Kierkegaard’s reading of Aristotle and arguably in 
his own thought as well, as I will illustrate in my analysis of one of the 
upbuilding discourses. Fourth, Kierkegaard is aware of the importance 
of the distinction between ποιεῖν (poiein) and πραττεῖν (prattein) in Aris­
totle, albeit that his interest is limited to how they function in poetry and 
art. Fifth, Kierkegaard understands the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia 
or happiness as an activity that is desirable in itself. Finally, Kierkegaard 
adopts the Aristotelian definition of motion (κίνησις, kinèsis) as a transi­
tion from possibility to actuality and this is a central point of departure for 
his thinking about freedom, the development of the self, and actuality.44
43Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 386 / SKS 19, 388; Not13:14.
44Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 385–386, 393 / SKS 19, 387–389, 396; Not13: 
10–21, 27. 
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Yet, it is questionable whether these Aristotelian concepts really had a 
deep impact on Kierkegaard’s thought. Kierkegaard also offers criticism 
of Aristotle, which reveals important differences between Aristotle and 
his own approach. In his notes of 1842, he criticizes Aristotle for his lim­
ited, aesthetic understanding of the human self as directed to happiness 
in the sense of intellectual contemplation. The contemplative life is un­
derstood in aesthetic terms and as isolation and not in terms of becoming 
spirit: “the happiness of the divine doesn’t consist in contemplation but 
in eternal communication.”45 Surely, Løkke is right that Kierkegaard 
here posits something beyond Aristotle for which the latter should not 
be blamed. However, when Løkke describes Kierkegaard’s criticism as 
being that “Aristotle’s only fault in this regard is that he was born too 
early,”46 such a qualification ignores that Kierkegaard here reveals how he 
envisions the relationship between Greek and Christian thought, namely 
that a philosopher like Aristotle may provide us with a valuable concept 
of virtue, formation and its teleological structure, but that he “lacks the 
category needed to complete the movement.”47 Christian categories do not 
oppose or replace ancient categories, but indeed add something crucial to 
these categories, and transform them in a profound way. This is precisely 
how Kierkegaard deals with classical virtue ethics: the whole perspective 
changes as soon as character and virtue are conceived as before God.
In a journal entry from 1849, Kierkegaard explains the difference in ap­
proach between a classical virtue­ethical approach and his own Protestant 
view:
Luther says, It is not good works that make a good man, but a good man 
who does good works, i.e. the man is what has become habitual, something 
more than all individual actions. And, indeed, according to Luther, one be­
comes a good man through faith. Thus, first comes faith. It is not through a 
virtuous life, good works, and the like, that one attains faith. No, it is faith 
that causes one truly to do good works.48
The main difference does not concern the formal description of virtue, for 
Aristotle too emphasizes that the good man is the one who has acquired 
good attitudes, which are more than individual actions. The point is that 
in Luther’s Christian conception the source of the virtues differs: faith 
rather than what a human being himself accomplishes. This conviction 
is reflected in the famous remark in The Sickness unto Death that “the op­
posite of sin is not virtue, but faith,”49 which is not intended as an entire 
disqualification of virtue, but as an acknowledgement of the difference 
45Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 387 / SKS 19, 389; Not13:20.
46Løkke, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 58.
47Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 3, 387 / SKS 19, 389; Not13:20 (emphasis mine).
48Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 6, 373 / SKS 22, 369; NB14:42. 
49Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 82 / SKS 11, 196.
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in grammar and tradition between antiquity and Christianity.50 At this 
point, we could say that although Kierkegaard does not explicitly refer 
to Aquinas, his Lutheran conception of faith based virtue is in line with 
the theological nature of a Thomistic virtue ethics. Yet, as I will show, 
Kierkegaard also differs from Aquinas, especially in regard of the latter’s 
harmonious view of nature and grace. Kierkegaard’s Lutheran model 
does not build grace upon nature, but asks for a complete renouncement 
of natural capacities in order to rest on grace.
In sum, Kierkegaard concurs in many respects with Aristotle (and 
Aquinas), but, as far as I can see, none of the Aristotelian concepts 
Kierkegaard mentions in his notes on the Nicomachean Ethics plays a 
decisive role in his published works. There are only a few references to 
these concepts, such as the notion of the mean in The Sickness unto Death, 
which, however, he understands in a non­Aristotelian way as ne quid nimis, 
“mediocrity,” and as such criticizes it.51 Explicit references to Aristotelian 
concepts like prohairesis, eudaimonia or praxis are absent, which does not 
imply that Kierkegaardian concepts like “decision” or “choice,” “eternal 
happiness” and “existence” do not show commonality with these Aristo­
telian concepts. In conclusion, what we find in Kierkegaard’s works are no 
more and no less than classical virtue­ethical traces. However, an analysis 
of how some virtues and virtue­ethical elements appear in his upbuilding 
works will demonstrate that Kierkegaard’s contribution consists in what 
he adds to the virtue ethical tradition.
“To Need God . . . ”: The Inverted Language of Perfection
Let us first observe the appearance of the word “virtue” in the upbuilding 
discourses. It is not frequently used, but whenever Kierkegaard speaks 
about virtue (Dyd) it is in a positive way. The concept of virtue is appro­
priate to the purpose of upbuilding. In one of the discourses in “The Gospel 
of Sufferings” Kierkegaard speaks of “the road of virtue,” which we cannot 
precisely locate but consists in “how it is walked.”52 Another discourse 
emphasizes: “It is true and always will be true that virtue is the highest 
sagacity”53 and speaks of “the beautiful virtue of conciliatory spirit.”54 In 
the discourse “Against Cowardliness” virtue is called a “sacred word.”55 
Kierkegaard quotes Ludwig de Ponte saying that it is wretched “to have 
an abundance of intentions and a poverty of action, to be rich in truths 
and poor in virtues.”56 This utterance functions in an argument about the 
50See Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein,” 151.
51Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 86–87 / SKS 11, 200.
52Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 289 / SKS 8, 384.
53Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 380 / SKS 5, 363.
54Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 380 / SKS 5, 364. Note that on the same page 
duty too functions in being dedicated to willing and practicing the good.
55Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 370 / SKS 5, 355.
56Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 350 / SKS 5, 337.
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virtue of courage, meaning to act in the face of danger instead of avoiding 
action like a coward. In courageous action, the good is seen as “the goal,” 
as “the truly great and noble,” though it only takes on concrete meaning as 
something particular in relation to an individual’s particularity.57 Besides 
these clearly virtue-ethical explications, Kierkegaard speaks of various 
vices that have to be conquered in the ethical task of becoming oneself, 
which includes overcoming oneself. In one’s inner being there may be “the 
temptations of glory and temptations of fear and temptations of despon­
dency, of pride and of defiance and of sensuality.”58 In these and several 
other instances, the language of virtue appears to be appropriate for the 
upbuilding task. Although virtue itself does not function as a core concept 
in the discourses but rather serves the upbuilding aim, Kierkegaard’s use 
of it is in line with traditional virtue ethical language.
Another virtue­ethical trace can be detected in how Kierkegaard applies 
the language of perfection (or excellence) in the discourses. At the same 
time, it becomes clear that unlike Plato and Aristotle, the virtues can not 
be achieved autonomously by one’s own agency. Although the language 
is reminiscent of virtue ethics, perfection is not a matter of perfectibility of 
human nature in an Aristotelian sense, but is exclusively interpreted in the 
religious context of the relationship with God. In the discourse “To Need 
God is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection,” the self has to be turned away 
from the external in order to understand in profound self-knowledge that 
he is “not capable of anything at all.”59
Here, we find an example of what Kierkegaard calls “inverted dialectic” 
or “dialectic of reversal,”60 which he employs in his upbuilding works to 
set out how in a Christian sense the positive is characterized by the nega­
tive and loss in the worldly sense is gain in a deeper sense, just as “the 
butterfly gains by losing the caterpillar’s chrysalis.”61 Thus, perfection is 
paradoxically present in the acknowledgment of one’s incapability. The 
highest a person can achieve is to become fully convinced that he himself 
is capable of nothing.62 The self must “become nothing before God”63 in 
order to rest in God “who is capable of all things.”64 Perfection includes 
the acknowledgment of one’s “real self,” and is interpreted as dependency 
on God. Kierkegaard wants to make his reader aware of the gift-like char­
acter of the self. In the end, it is not by one’s own power that one becomes 
57Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 357–358 / SKS 5, 343–344. 
58Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 320 / SKS 5, 311.
59Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 319 / SKS 5, 310.
60Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 4, 116, 292–293 / SKS 20, 194 and 292; NB:194 
and NB4:11.
61Kierkegaard, Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 4, 292–293 / SKS 20, 292; NB4:11.
62Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 307 / SKS 5, 300.
63Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 369 / SKS 5, 354.
64Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 318 / SKS 5, 309–310. See also The Sickness 
unto Death, 71 / SKS 11, 185.
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oneself, since one cannot create oneself.65 In this sense, there is no true 
conception of the self without a corresponding conception of God.66 The 
rather extreme notion of “annihilation before God” is important in order 
to emphasize the religious moment in which the self becomes aware of 
the fact that he is not able to realize himself by himself. To need God is 
precisely the real perfection of man.
How is this theological perspective related to the philosophical­anthro­
pological “natural predisposition” we discovered previously? Interestingly, 
this discourse still presupposes that a person without the knowledge of 
dependency on God can still be a self with deep “roots in existence” and 
profound knowledge of its capabilities and talents which he develops “as 
much as possible in conformity with his given situation.”67 These natural 
capabilities are acknowledged, but from a religious upbuilding perspec­
tive such self­knowledge and self­realization is incomplete and may even 
be a delusion, since one knows oneself in relation to “something else” 
instead of knowing oneself in relation to oneself and to God. Hence, the 
emphasis is put on the inverted conception of perfection as incapability 
before God, who at the same time makes all things possible.68
Notwithstanding this radical transformation, the natural is thus 
somehow presupposed. That the former does not exclude the latter be­
comes also clear in the discourse “To Preserve One’s Soul in Patience”: “Let 
us praise what is truly praiseworthy, the glory of human nature; . . . let us 
pray that we might be granted the grace to perfect this glory gloriously in 
a more beautiful and more unambiguous way.”69 In one of the Christian 
discourses of “The Gospel of Sufferings,” Kierkegaard refers to the “moral 
order of things” that is “easily grasped” and “universally accepted.”70 All 
kinds of earthly ends or goods and related means belong to this order. 
On the other hand, Kierkegaard speaks of the “infinitely superior” end of 
“eternal happiness.”71 This good “beyond all measure”72 is decisive, which 
points to a radical transformation of nature by grace, a “profound change” 
of what “natural man” wishes or desires.73
65See Kierkegaard, Either/Or II, 215 / SKS 3, 207.
66Kierkegaard, Two Ages, 63 / SKS 5, 437; The Sickness unto Death, 40, 79, 113–114 / SKS 11, 
155, 193, 225–226; Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 160 / SKS 12, 163–164. See Vos, “Self,” 
23–28.
67Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 313 / SKS 5, 304.
68Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 313–314 / SKS 5, 305–306.
69Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 182 / SKS 5, 186. 
70Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 312 / SKS 8, 404–405.
71Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 312 / SKS 8, 404–405.
72Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 312 / SKS 8, 404–405.
73Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 250 / SKS 8, 349. See also 141 / SKS 
8, 239, where Kierkegaard distinguishes between an eternal understanding in which “the 
means and the end are one and the same,” and the temporal, mundane understanding in 
which “the end is considered more important than the means.”
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I think that “transformation” is indeed an adequate description of 
how Christian conceptions of faith and grace relate to natural virtuous­
ness in Kierkegaard’s thought. Transformation implies more than just the 
perfection or completion of nature, but less than the complete replacement 
of nature by grace. Although Kierkegaard uses the language of perfection, 
he does not adopt a Thomistic model of gratia perficit naturam, since this 
model would be too harmonious. Rather than by (natural) progress or a 
Thomistic completion of natural capacities, in this view virtue is marked 
by transformation that requires “inversion” and “conversion.” In the 
end, this has to do with the radical nature of human fallibility and sin. As 
Sylvia Walsh states, in Kierkegaard’s view human character is formed via 
a relation to God in Christ, who not only atones for human sin but also 
constitutes the qualitative criterion and ethical goal for human selfhood, 
“which is always in the process of being realized due to its infinite char­
acter and the continuation of sin.”74
A Grammar of Virtue
In Kierkegaard’s treatment of specific classical and Christian virtues in the 
upbuilding works we detect similar patterns of both continuity and dis­
continuity with classical and medieval virtue ethics. Courage, for instance, 
presupposes that there is some resistance. As in the traditional descrip­
tion, courage is the proper attitude for facing danger and for overcoming 
anxiety; Kierkegaard uses the metaphor of a rider on a horse. The rider 
is the courageous one that subdues what is base and shying in him.75 On 
the other hand, courage is understood within a Christian framework of 
meaning, namely as an attitude that is related to suffering rather than to 
fighting. The notion that courage is marked by voluntary and avoidable 
suffering reflects a Christian conceptualization of this virtue. The prime 
example is not the warrior, as in the Greek conception, but the martyr who 
is willing to suffer for the good.
Another important virtue in the upbuilding works is patience. Whereas 
“courage goes freely into the suffering that could be avoided, . . . patience 
makes itself free in the unavoidable suffering.”76 Patience perfectly illus­
trates what virtue is: “a category of freedom” making literally “a virtue of 
necessity,” of what is defined as necessity, namely the unavoidable.77 Again 
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a natural and a Christian conception 
74Walsh, “Becoming a Person of Character,” 92. However, her claim that Kierkegaard 
may be called an ethicist of character and not a virtue ethicist is not convincing, since 
this ignores the presence of a grammar of virtue. Walsh emphasizes the discontinuity of 
Kierkegaard with Aristotelianism and Thomism, but neglects the continuity that is also 
present in Kierkegaard’s works. Moreover, the emphasis on the process of becoming of 
character and selfhood as such is not contrary to Aristotle and Aquinas, whereas the radical 
nature of sin and the need for complete redemption is.
75Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 118 / SKS 8, 119.
76Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 119 / SKS 8, 220. 
77Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 119 / SKS 8, 221.
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of patience. In a natural sense patience is beneficial in order to achieve 
something in life—the expectation, the fulfillment is so to say bound up 
with temporality. In this case, patience is directed to an external condition, 
to something that is gained by virtue of patience as a means.78 Reli­
giously speaking, patience is required in order to gain and preserve one’s 
soul; moreover, gaining one’s soul is precisely gaining patience. Finally, 
patience is defined in terms derived from the Christian tradition. Patience 
is not just about giving each person and each thing the time they need or 
waiting for the fulfillment of a wish, but real patience “leaves its expec­
tancy up to God.”79
From this perspective it is understandable that an Aristotelian virtue 
like magnanimity is not seen as a virtue, because of the assumption that 
it is important that you have much to give. Rather than magnanimity, it 
is the Christian virtue of mercy that comes to the fore.80 For mercifulness 
consists not in what one gives but in how one gives.81 Finally, the discourses 
show some traces of the trio of faith, hope and love.82 These virtues func­
tion in keeping a person in the decision to be with the good; as such they 
are treated by Kierkegaard, like Aquinas, as virtues of the will. On the 
other hand, we nowhere find the Thomistic conception of infused virtues 
as habits that enable one to acquire salvation through a supernatural 
enhancement of one’s natural capabilities. It is not by infusion but by 
receiving redemption and by participating in God’s renewal of the self 
that we may grow in the virtues. In this way, various other virtues are 
described in language that both reflects elements of a multifaceted history 
of virtue ethics and emphasizes different elements.
Admittedly, Kierkegaard does not offer a coherent table of cardinal and 
theological virtues and virtues that can be derived from them, as Aquinas 
does. Therefore, the proper approach is to examine whether an essential 
grammar of virtue is present in Kierkegaard’s treatment of those qualities 
we usually call virtues. Following Roberts’s Wittgensteinian approach, 
“grammar” in this case means “some kind of internal conceptual order 
that the virtue possesses.”83 “Grammar” also points to the distinctiveness 
of a particular language of virtue and the virtues, bringing out “those dis­
tinctive concepts in terms of which an exemplifier of these virtues ‘sees the 
world.’”84 Kierkegaard’s treatment of the virtues in the upbuilding works 
displays at least three grammatical rules that may be regarded as constitu­
tive of the grammar of virtue he uses.
78Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 161–162 / SKS 5, 161–162. 
79Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 221 / SKS 5, 220. 
80Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 362 / SKS 5, 348. 
81Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 327.
82For instance, Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 100–101 / SKS 8, 
204–205.
83Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein,” 154.
84Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein,” 155.
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A first grammatical rule is that virtues are not simply described as 
dispositions to perform actions that follow ethical rules, but rather as 
encompassing attitudes of a person as moral character. In Kierkegaard’s 
description of patience, for instance, a kind of circularity functions that is 
akin to Aristotle—patience is developed through patient action and the 
virtue of patience enables one to act patiently—which also underscores 
that virtue is an encompassing attribute characterizing a person: “The 
person who grows in patience does indeed grow and develop. What is 
it that grows in him? It is patience. Consequently, patience grows in him, 
and how does it grow? Through patience.”85
A second grammatical rule concerns the complex psychology of virtue, in 
which one virtue is in one way or another related to other virtues. In order to 
be courageous, one has to be prudent as well. It may also require persever­
ance, hope and other virtues. This aspect is traditionally expressed in the 
so-called doctrine of “the unity of the virtues.” Kierkegaard does not offer 
an account of such doctrine, but in his treatment of the virtue of meekness 
or “gentle courage,” for instance, he demonstrates that this virtue is at 
least compounded of other virtues:
There is courage [Mod], which bravely defies dangers; there is high-mind­
edness [Høimod], which proudly lifts itself above grievances; there is pa­
tience [Taalmod], which patiently bears sufferings; but the gentle courage 
[sagte Mod] that carries the heavy burden lightly is still the most wonderful 
compound.86
In “gentle courage” or meekness the strength of courage and the endur­
ance of patience are combined. Moreover, the virtues find their unity in 
their directedness toward the good. The pursuit of this goal requires other 
virtues, for instance love, self­control and resoluteness.87
A third element belonging to the grammar of virtue is that a broad range 
of human capacities such as knowledge, emotion, will and imagination are 
involved.88 In my view, this applies to Kierkegaard’s treatment of the vir­
tues, although not without reserve: in the end the will seems to be decisive. 
In “Purity of Heart” the relationship between feeling, knowledge, and will 
becomes clear. In relation to the good, the starting point is “immediate 
feeling,” which is “the vital force” in which “is life,” but this feeling “must 
‘be kept’” in order not to lead to double-mindedness. It must “not be left 
to its own devices, but . . . be entrusted to the power of something higher 
that keeps it.”89 It needs “knowledge of the good,” which provides a clear 
understanding of one’s situation. However, knowledge and understanding 
85Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 169 / SKS 5, 168.
86Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 239–240 / SKS 8, 339.
87Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 361 / SKS 5, 347: “it is certainly true that the 
good, the truly great and noble, is different for different people, but resolution, which is the 
true acknowledgement, is still the same. This is a very upbuilding thought.”
88Roberts, “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein,” 154–155. 
89Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 72 / SKS 8, 179.
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can also deteriorate into double­mindedness, as soon as they call you 
away from actuality for the sake of obtaining an observer’s point of view. 
Knowledge or understanding must “penetrate time,” in a “deliberation” 
that will not lead to knowledge from the “distance of eternity” but to a 
real understanding of oneself in actuality.90 Therefore, ultimately the will 
is needed as the most decisive capacity in one’s dedication to the good. It 
even seems that the will completely overrules knowledge and reason: it is 
double­mindedness to think that not “the will is the mover but that it itself 
is to be moved . . . and supported by reasons, considerations, the advice 
of others, experiences, and rules of conduct.”91 Yet, this is only one part of 
the story. As Roberts has pointed out, the upbuilding discourses repeat­
edly instruct the reader how to think about a particular situation. The key 
to gaining freedom from all kinds of care, for instance, is not to change 
one’s physical or social circumstances, but to change one’s way of thinking 
about a situation.92 It is the “power of thought” that can take away “the 
thought of possession.”93 Consciousness, i.e., a particular way of thinking, 
is a decisive condition in an upbuilding process in which one also comes 
to know oneself.94 Thus, religious thoughts are the basis for a configura­
tion of emotional responses. These patterns of response may become stable 
dispositions of the personality.
As a whole, the discourses show an ambiguous evaluation of thought 
and reason, including what we may call “prudence” or “practical wisdom” 
in the sense of phronesis. Reason can be used both positively and nega­
tively. On the one hand, (religious) thought and understanding definitely 
have a positive function in how to respond to the vicissitudes of life. On 
the other hand, reason can operate as Klogthed, meaning “shrewdness,” 
“calculating smartness,” “sophisticated reasoning,” which makes one 
avoid real dedication to the good and real resoluteness over against those 
vicissitudes. One must do away with all such calculation, shrewdness and 
probability, in order to will the good only “because it is the good.”95 In 
this respect the Augustinian and Protestant emphasis on the will is indeed 
prevalent over the acknowledgment of human rational powers. Although 
Kierkegaard thus gives a particular ordering of the human capacities re­
lated to the virtues, he nevertheless does employ what we have called a 
“grammar of virtue.”
90Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 73–74 / SKS 8, 180–181.
91Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 75 / SKS 8, 182.
92Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue,” 190–191.
93Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 26 / SKS 10, 38. 
94Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 314 / SKS 5, 306. See also the theme “What 
Meaning and What Joy There Are in the Thought of Following Christ” (Kierkegaard, Up­
building Discourses in Various Spirits, 218 / SKS 8, 320, italics mine) and the title “Thoughts that 
Wound from Behind—for Upbuilding” (Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, 161 / SKS 10, 169, 
italics mine).
95Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 380 / SKS 5, 364.
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Conclusion
Is Kierkegaard a virtue ethicist? The answer depends on how virtue ethics 
is defined. In her concise analysis, Swanton argues that neither a concept 
of virtue ethics as directed to the flourishing (eudaimonia) of the possessor 
of virtue, to excellence and practical wisdom as necessary components, 
nor a concept of virtue ethics that takes agent­centeredness as its core, but 
a concept of virtue ethics that centers on virtue notions in general, such 
as justice or kindness, should be taken to define what is to be regarded as 
virtue ethics and what not.96 If we follow this argument, Kierkegaard is 
to be regarded as a virtue ethicist, since he explicitly and implicitly refers 
to both the vocabulary and the grammar of virtue and the virtues. How­
ever, in the sense of a pre­eminent representative of the ethical theory that 
most consider to be virtue ethics par excellence, i.e., Aristotelianism and 
Thomism, Kierkegaard can not be regarded as a virtue ethicist without 
reserve. As a whole, his explicit references to this particular tradition are 
too limited and his explorations of virtue and the virtues are too different 
for such a qualification.
Although Kierkegaard’s conception of the will and his overall moral 
psychology differ from Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s, Kierkegaard’s depic­
tions of virtue and the virtues in the upbuilding discourses demonstrate 
that both a particular vocabulary of virtue and a “grammar of virtue” are 
clearly present. Precisely because of his specific treatment of virtue and the 
virtues, Kierkegaard offers a particular contribution to the broad tradition 
of virtue ethics. In Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses the virtues serve 
the aim of the upbuilding, i.e., to make the reader aware of him­ or herself 
as existing “before God.” The upbuilding can be seen as directed towards 
the telos of selfhood and as such functions in a teleologically structured 
anthropological view. As MacIntyre himself suggests, what separates him 
from Kierkegaard is not the lack of teleology, but the different concep­
tions of reason, deliberate choice and the relationship between the natural 
and the theological. Whereas MacIntyre, in line with Aquinas, considers 
revelation to be completely in line with ethical reason and the theological 
virtues to be additional to the natural virtues, in Kierkegaard’s Augustinian­
Protestant view the necessity of radical transformation is pivotal, yet not in 
such a way that the natural capacities of human nature are completely 
ruled out. Radical transformation is needed since a human being cannot 
achieve moral excellence by his own activity, as Kierkegaard already ob­
served in his early remarks on Aristotle’s ethics. The importance of this 
notion is that it recognizes that character formation is deeply frustrated 
by moral flaws and human shortcomings. Therefore, in his moral striving 
the human being continuously depends on God’s grace as the true source 
of his perfection.
Protestant Theological University
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